Н. А. Дельвиг, Л. И. Редькина

Изменение концепции военного образования в России в XIX веке в связи с событиями крымской кампании

Процесс становления и развития военного образования в России является неотъемлемой частью историко-педагогического наследия нашей страны. Качественная профессиональная подготовка личного состава и воспитание настоящих патриотов России всегда считались приоритетной задачей отечественной военной школы. Тем не менее, концепция военного образования во все времена напрямую зависела от внешней военно-политической обстановки, складывающихся военных угроз, средств и способов ведения войны. Так, противостояние России союзнической коалиции, объединившей Англию, Францию, Турцию и Сардинское королевство, вошедшее во всемирную историю как Крымская война (1853-56 гг.), рассматривается как ключевое событие, повлиявшее на алгоритм формирования принципиально новой модели военного образования. Данный период характеризуется как переломный в вопросах межгосударственной военной политики, что активизировало процесс модернизации военной техники. Появление новых классов кораблей, таких как броненосные крейсера и эсминцы потребовали полного пересмотра военно-образовательной концепции в целях подготовки специалистов принципиально нового уровня. Таким образом, в данной статье, основанной на материалах исторической хроники, проводится анализ особенностей развития морского образования до и после Крымской войны – события, в значительной степени повлиявшего на необходимость пересмотра тактики военно-морского флота, что повлекло за собой внесение серьезных изменений в содержание военного образования.

Ключевые слова: военно-морское искусство, военная тактика и стратегия, практические навыки, учебная деятельность, военный потенциал, подготовка квалифицированных специалистов

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The conceptual changes of Russian military education in the 19th century: the Crimean war – before and after

The process of foundation and development of military education system in Russia is considered to be the essential part of historical and pedagogical heritage of our country. The priority task of our military school has been determined as providing not only the professional compliment training, but upbringing the true patriots as well. Nevertheless, the military educational Concept has always been directly influenced by the foreign military policy, armed threats, means and ways of conducting the war. So, one of the main episodes of the Russian Empire history which influenced the process of foundation of an entirely new model of military education is the resistance of Russia to the Allied coalition containing Great Britain, France, Turkey and the Kingdom of Sardinia. This event is scripted in world history as the Crimean War or the Crimean Campaign (1853-56). As for as in the middle of the 19th century the Eastern question really turned into the key problem of Russian Imperial policy causing some international contradictions, it turned into a period of weaponry revolution in order for Russia to be able to defend itself. New classes of ships, such as, for example, armored cruisers or destroyers started to be produced, which required fundamental changes in the system of naval education. In the present research which is based on studying the historical chronicle the authors demonstrate the evolution of the military educational concept on the example of the Crimean War – the event that preceded the global changes in the sphere of the Navy tactics that caused the changes of military educational content.

Keywords: military art, naval tactics and strategy, practical skills, educational activity, military potential, training the efficient personnel

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Introduction

Since the ancient times the war has become the essential part of human civilization development. Wars define the destinies of peoples and empires and never forgive mistakes especially in the questions of tactics and strategy. The frequently asked question if 'doctrine drive technology' or 'technology drives the doctrine' has always been the point of military discussions. Anyway, advanced industrial and technological rise of the middle of the 19th century proved that in most cases, 'doctrine is driving technology' [2, p. 356].

Research Focus

1. Significant historical events certainly dominated over the military educational doctrine of the Russian Empire during the 19th century.

2. Developing innovation technologies and military industry leads to the necessity of changing the training methods, academic content and introducing entirely new branches of military science such as the naval tactics.

3. The analysis of scientific literature made it possible to conclude that the majority of researches were represented either as historical chronicles proving the significance of the Crimean War in European political, economical and social life [15], or history narrations about military education development [9]. None of the researches conducted before provided the complex historical and pedagogical analysis of the particular influence of the Crimea War to the development of such worldly recognized branch of science as naval doctrine and strategy and the way of educating the efficient specialists able to command the squadrons armed with improved weaponry.

Methodology of Research

Researching the reasons of global changes in the sphere of military education, taking into consideration the interdisciplinary position of the present research, it seems necessary to apply a multidisciplinary approach using the principles and methods of various subjects: history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, pedagogy, cultural anthropology and military science. Thus, the methodological basis of this article is: philosophy statements about the relationship of social development processes; social and historical aspects of the processes taking place on the Black Sea Fleet territory in the middle of the 19th century; the theory of military education development. The authors conduct the analysis on the basis of axiological approach, allowing to determine the main aspects from the auxiliary ones in order to concentrate on the most important preconditions of educational revolution in Russia as well as the theory of maritime education and continuous professional education concept in the sphere of the naval one.

Discussion

There are some excellent lessons to be learned which demonstrate the way of military doctrine development. Analyzing this aspect we got curious if the Navy doctrine has existed

in the past; if it is good to study the doctrinal lessons which should be extracted from history; if military doctrine is something that is constantly changing due to a variety of circumstances.

Indeed, important doctrinal lessons can be mostly extracted from history, starting from the sailing fleet era. The Crimean War (1853-56) is one of the distinctive events that significantly changed the Navy doctrine and made the Russian Fleet commanders argue on such issues as the main form of attack, the object of the attack (the escorted ships or its escorts), how much of the attacking force should be withheld in reserve, the most important defense factor (the protection of escorted ships or the defeat of the enemy's offensive fighting power).

The attempt of writing Navy doctrine without a serious history review would never become possible. But not so many of Russian military leaders were involved into the process of scientific theoretical researches. The founder of such a scientific concept in Russia military educator and publicist Nikolay Klado teaches us that creating the Navy paradigm without uniting naval art and naval science is just impossible. Innovations and educational methods – these are the things to be tied together.

That was the conclusion to which the Navy came after several mistakes and failures. Primarily, it became necessary to create maritime educational establishments in Novorossiysk province (the Russian South) at the end of the 18th century due to the rapid integration processes that had taken place in the area right after annexing the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Empire by Catherine the Great. Shipbuilding turned into the main perspective of developing the Russian South thanks to positive climatic conditions and geopolitical location.

On January, 31, 1783 Catherine issued the order to create maritime cadet college in the city of Kherson [18]. The 4 year academic course included studying calculus, algebra, geometry, history and political geography. The cadets were also lectured the basis of orthodoxy and Gospel. Everyone had to learn two foreign languages minimum and choose in between Greek, Italian, Russian, German, French as alternative. After passing the finals the graduates were promoted to the rank of the midshipmen either for joining the Navy or for continuing the studies, having spent some extra years practicing in artillery or shipbuilding [14].

Rapid development of shipbuilding required the foundation of the Black Sea shipbuilding college which educated both the boys from the military families and the representatives of different social classes starting from 9 years old. The academic course lasted for 8 years and included studying engineering construction, mechanics, the theory of shipbuilding, grammar, English. Special attention was paid to developing practical skills onboard the commissioned ships [23].

It is hard to predict how long such system would have existed if it were not the events of the Crimean War – the pivoting point in developing not only the system of maritime education but the entire Navy as well as having determined the new perspectives of its development for further decades. It was the event that completely changed the long way of developing the sailing fleet, making the Russians realize that despite all those efforts of constructing the new Admiralties, training the shipbuilders and founding the educational establishments Russian shipbuilding was still much behind the European one [1]. The War persuasively demonstrated that the sailing vessels did not have any future. So, under the conditions of the Russian scientific technological revolution there emerged a great need in highly efficient maritime specialists of the new generation. This war was both technologically and psychologically advanced, if it's possible to say so, from the position of developing new equipment. For example, Napoleon III, who was thousands of miles away from the battle

field, was trying to guide his troops through a telegraph which was one of the Crimean War innovations [15].

The other significant achievement such as the steam ships were represented by the British and French fleets. The Russian commanders seriously insisted on attacking with their ship artillery and on using the perfect sailors' skills, but were seriously disappointed after discovering that steamers turned to be more powerful than the sailing vessels. Making a powerful steam fleet is an expensive affair which has to be stimulated by a certain combat doctrine. What does Russia need such a powerful steam fleet for? Building such a fleet would certainly require serious investments which are used for the army maintenance. So, in conditions of serfdom and low economy Russia did not have any steam fleet at the beginning of the Crimean War [3].

One more important achievement worth mentioning about is a notorious rifle. The rifle was already known long before the Crimean War, e.g. during the Napoleonic wars the Russian Army had enough union guns. The problem was that those rifles had a significant low rate of fire, although they had a bigger range and accuracy.

But this is not all. It seemed that if the Crimean War experience demonstrated the superiority of the rifles, all the countries would quickly get rid of the old smoothbore guns. At least the war participants, who paid for that experience with blood, will do that. As one of the Russian outstanding Army commanders Alexander Suvorov once stated in his book "The science to win" 'the bullet is a fool, the bayonet is a fellow' [20, p.86]. On this occasion Napoleon III had to encourage his soldiers by saying: "Keep close to each other during the battle! The new rifles are only dangerous from a distance; it cannot compete with a bayonet, which is still a terrifying weapon of the French infantry" [3, p.141].

At that time it could seem that such primitive ammunition could conquer the world, but the war evolution was in rush. The gap of just twenty years proved that primitive field and naval tactics was the affair of deep past [10].

Operating the steamers required recruiting technically clever people, able to serve the new equipment which lead to conscripting the representatives of the working class having the basic professional skills mostly obtained while working at industrial enterprises. In military terms, this war was a midway point between Waterloo and the Russian-Japanese War. The armies employed Napoleonic uniforms and tactics, but improved weapons. It emphasized the overriding importance of logistics, entrenchments and firepower [8].

On paper at least, Russia's army appeared quite impressive. One may think that size is a certain bonus but the point is not the number of soldiers, the main point is tactics and strategy! The founder of Russian Naval tactics Nikolay Klado was brave enough to criticize the Russian manner of conducting a battle, drawing the commanders' attention to the fact that the war never forgave the mistakes, proving this axiom by the detailed analysis of the Crimean war failures. Having dedicated too much of his activity to analyzing the reasons of Russian tragedy he came to the reasonable conclusion that on the one hand Russia underestimated the combat potential of the Allied coalition and on the other – the Russians completely neglected the contestant's psychology. He was sure that in the period of rapidly developing technologies the officers should not have to be passive to researching the scientific questions, and the idea of easy victory seemed absolutely fake to him. He used to say that victory was not the result of the compliment number but nothing more than skills and experience. In attempt to change the mentality of Russian commanders he promoted the idea of higher military education and encouraged the commanders to give more initiative to the subordinates in order to be able to act as a single whole while the war

actions. The Russian outstanding 19th century literary classics Fedor Dostoyevsky being too far from conducting wars stated: "Today the victory is achieved mostly by skills and mind, but not by the ammunition..." [5, p.219]. The muscles were losing its significance. That was the beginning of an entirely new period – the era of minds and scientific technologies. Of course, size could be an advantage, but for Russia it turned into a heavy burden. While numerically Russia had the largest army, much of it was ineffectual. The total number of regular army approached roughly to one million men who could hardly be well supported by the government. Moreover under the conditions of overall conscription, the majority of the men were illiterate being hardly able to identify left from right. The paradox is that at the same time the British managed to construct a railway line near Balaklava, the British camp, the place that for the period of campaign turned into "little London". As once William Howard Russell said: "If the war is a great destroyer, it is also a great creator." [17, p.50].

One more factor that destabilized Russia's ability to defeat the allies was the one that was actually shared by all participants involved was frequent cases of cholera. It's hard to calculate the losses and the reasons of the human death but according to some researches, during the Crimean War, roughly four times as many men died from this disease than on the battlefield. The statistics of French cholera losses were so threatening that at first they even discovered that the air in the hospital was the only reason, even trying to treat straight at the battlefields of Sevastopol, where 20,000 troops and seamen died. Unfortunately, the idea of poor sanitation and poor junior medical staff training was common among nearly all the nineteenth-century armies. The epidemic situation was just threatening in "Little London" as well. W.H. Russell describing the state of affairs in Balaklava spotted: "As to the town itself, words could not describe its filth, its horrors, its hospitals, its burials, its dead and dying Turks, its crowded lanes, its noisome sheds, its beastly purlieus, or its decay." [17, p.23]. This description is nothing else but the precise look at the situation in general, for both the Allies and Russia.

Once a great super-power in the European arena – Russia, – suffered a grievous setback to its authority when it was forced to capitulate in 1856 to the Allies. Russia completely forgot that searching for the examples of naval art the commanders should never share the facts into the main and secondary. Creative thinking, the ability to express one's thought logically and laconically are the factors of combat success. According to N. Klado, brilliant combat qualities of the Russian Crimean War commanders could not find its practical application in the situation lacking the sequence of opinions and actions. In his book "The history of naval art" he critically pointed to Admiral Nakhimov's order to postpone the attack, and after – attacking in a line formation. The other disadvantage was that the issued order contained several details among which the main point could hardly be understood. As a result on the 10th of September 1854 seven sailing vessels were scuttled blocking the way to Sevastopol for the Allies. The Russian Black Sea Fleet committed a suicide approaching to its complete defeat [12].

As far as N. Klado concludes that was the consequence of lack of studying tactics. Anyway he does not blame the personalities, he just refers to the fact that the academic process in the maritime educational establishments was a form being perfect in the first half of the 19th century. In accordance with this he encouraged just to concentrate and be brave enough not to forget those tragic events but to refer to its historic background again and again to make proper conclusions.

Yes, the Crimean War definitely made the Navy Elite think of military education gaps. Yes, there aren't any doubts concerning the effectiveness of reforms initiated by the Russian

Military Minister Dmitriy Milutin, but there is no need to object the fact that the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century in pre-revolutionary Russia is characterized as a period of rapid technological development, directly determining the educational doctrine.

This tendency is clearly demonstrated in the Navy. Right after turning the post Crimea War Navy into the powerful Fleet of steamers and introducing the innovational tactics, Russia made another effort in producing new armored ships, minelayers, submarines in order not to fall behind the leading world Navy Empires.

As far as it was mentioned before, military reforms and technical improvements can never exist separately from educational affairs as far as there must always be someone to maintain the prominent equipment.

Searching for the examples of military art either in this or in that war, the details of combat situation must never escape from the Commander's attention. So, according to N. Klado excellent Black Sea Fleet combat training and outstanding commanding qualities of its leaders – Admirals Kornilov and Nakhimov could not be applied practically due to their inability to analyze the strategic task as a single whole [11].

During the transition period, being on the way to the new standards of naval education, the historical experience has been thoroughly researched. Later not only military but also the highly educated civilian teachers were involved in lecturing in the military colleges significantly increasing the academic level [19]. Primarily the academic program was designed for the average pupil but further on it became much more complicated thus the academic standards were renewed.

Combining two factors theoretical and practical seemed to be the most complicated task from the point of view of teaching the new generation of future Navy commanders.

The pedagogical experience of teaching tactics in Maritime Military College in St. Petersburg helped N. Klado to introduce a totally new academic activity called the Naval Game. It could easily be used in the process of studying tactics at any level from the cadet college to Naval Academy and didn't require any special conditions. Just a good selection of Navy Reference books, a pencil, a piece of paper and of course the participants.

The point of this activity was in imitating the combat conflict from a real past or it could just be the imagined one. The procedure itself consisted of three episodes:

1. The preparatory stage (sharing the participants into groups; battle scene determination; making up the general war plan using the precise data from reference-books, marine charts, sailing directions – the imitation of Naval Staff actions).
2. Reproducing the events (comparing combat factors, making maneuvers).
3. The discussion stage (the level of participants' training is of the main importance, whether these were the experienced combat officers or the cadets) [4].

Having been working on the methodology of conducting the Naval Game N. Klado considered the first stage to be the most important for the young officers or the cadets when it is necessary to teach how to take all the details of the potential enemy's combat power into consideration. This type of work is basically done by the officers of the primary positions.

As for training the tactical level officers, for them the last stage is much more important because counting the losses and looking for the ways of eliminating the consequences is the Commanding officers' direct responsibility.

One more significant criteria of Naval officer training mentioned by Klado was studying the Navy history. The main skill to be developed while learning history is the "common sense" which is determined as "the ability to estimate the situation where one should act

properly and to propose the right order of actions” [13].

He stood his ground proving that before joining any war it's necessary to research not only the geopolitical specialties of the potential enemy but to find out as much as possible about its mentality.

His words were fatally proved to be true in 1905 when the Russian Fleet was defeated by the Navy of Japan during the Russian-Japanese War. Conducting the analysis of one more Russian failure the Japanese newspaper stated that the Japanese soldier was a patriot consciously loving his country being well-informed about the war reasons. “The Russians expected to see us depressed by the forthcoming difficulties of the war, being shy and escaping after the first Russian attack, but we didn't retreat and just move forward!”. This phrase was re-quoted by the “Translator” newspaper editor Ismail Gasprinskiy [7].

According to the Russian Finance Minister Sergei Witte it was really true that Russia thought of the war with Japan as of an insignificant local conflict [22]. The Russian Staff Commanders underestimated both the combat and the mental potential of the future enemy which led to an inevitable loss. Thus Klado's pedagogical ideas about the importance of studying tactics and history were clearly proved.

Another aspect that was worth paying attention to and that was not greatly cared about in the pre-Crimean War educational establishments was physical training. In the early military colleges nobody was eager to turn the physical classes into a proper system.

At the beginning of the 20th century one of the educational reformation experts I. Engelman publishing the article entitled “Physical upbringing of the Navy Compliment, its aims and organization” at the pages of “Maritime Journal” stated that “the main purpose is the victory to which one should strive concentrating all the thoughts and should be greatly inspired to achieve it” [6, p.1]. The author focused on the idea that the main combat element was the man. The real soldier should obtain both the academic knowledge and the physical stamina, thus “the ability to train smart and both morally and physically strong warrior is the main but simultaneously the most difficult teaching goal” [6, p. 2].

The profession of a military is one of not so numerous that require the concentration of all the human abilities – moral and physical and the human strength is demonstrated mostly during the war. The high level of physical development may be achieved only in the process of hard everyday training, that is why the questions of physical training in cadet colleges require conducting the discussions searching for the ideal way of doing so in the military educational establishments and should be considered as an equally important subject together with calculus, navigation, astronomy etc.

Since the ancient times the question of physical stamina was of great importance, and the main attention was paid to developing physical endurance. In the process of military technological development the physical culture started to loose the positions, moreover in the 19th century the situation in Russia was complicated by the negative influence of alcohol and tuberculoses [16].

The modern war really requires a great deposit of physical strength. The founder of Russian military psychology, doctor Grigoriy Shumkov was sure that “if there's really a very strong connection in between the human spiritual world and his body then it is necessary to fortify his body with the proper physical upbringing to teach him to resist severe difficulties and stress” [6, p. 2]

Thus, it could not be possible any more to follow the pre-war system of education. But while conducting the reforms D. Milutin proposed the plan of radical changes in the aspect of armament, army organization, combat training, military administration and

professional education. Something else had to be changed. Apart from improving the naval professionalism the high positioned offices needed to be taught an entirely new way of conducting a battle – new Navy tactics and strategy [14].

The participant of the Crimean War Rear Admiral Grigoriy Butakov held advanced views on the development of the Navy and made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of the Russian fleet. Simultaneously he made up the first Black Sea sailing directions introducing his innovation to the academic process. In 1867 he conducted the first laboratory experiments of mine, laying galvanic mines under the ships and testing the mine fields. In 1874, the armored frigate “Petropavlovsk”, used as a training ship as well, was first equipped with anti-torpedo artillery. G. Butakov was the first to introduce the theory of steam-powered armored fleet tactics. His book “New Foundations of Steamship Tactics” (1863), was the major contribution to the theory of naval warfare, and his “Rules of the steam ship maneuver” were recognized all over the world.

The lessons learned during the Crimean War made the Commanders think about the possible improvements in the sphere of medical education and service. The reports of the Black Sea Fleet commanders stated that quite often the injured were treated not in the hospitals but somewhere in private houses due to the lack of space and medical personnel. The system of battlefield medicine was well developed in central Russia but as for the Crimea it still desired to be much better. Here supervised by outstanding surgeon Nikolay Pirogov it was just in its starting state. By the beginning of Sevastopol siege the Crimean hospitals were prepared to treat just about 5000 people, but in fact more than 52000 were brought to the peninsula on the eve of the campaign. Moreover the battle of Alma (September, 20, 1854) clearly demonstrated such problems as lack of bandage stations close to the battlefields and the medical personnel was completely helpless in organizing the casual evacuation. It is indicated that during the period of war actions in Crimea there was an extreme need of junior medical personnel caused by serious war human losses. During the entire period of the Crimean campaign from 1853 up to 1856 out of 3759 conscripted paramedics more than 50% were either killed in actions or wounded [21].

N. Pirogov having estimated the process of organizing the evacuation of wounded from the battlefields pointed to the necessity of creating the separate companies of medical orderly and insisted on organizing special instructive classes for them. “The ordinary soldier will never perform as an efficient medical orderly...Due to this lots of wounded have several complications. Inefficient soldier is unable either to lift or to evacuate the wounded skillfully” [21, p.36].

Such a threatening situation definitely proved the idea of establishing “The Committee for improving the military medical and military hospital management”. Both in the Army and in the Navy it was decided to regularly conduct the organizational, preventive, sanitary hygienic, counter-epidemic and evacuation activities, directed to preventing the infectious diseases. Lecturing among the ship crews and small departments was nothing else but the responsibility of paramedics.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet and its Ports Admiral N. Arkas drew the attention of the Russian Emperor Alexander II to the necessity of intensifying the process of training the paramedics and insisted on reopening the military medical school in the port of Nikolaev.

It was decided to accept the boys aged 12 to 16 of non-military families for obtaining the profession of junior doctor. The pupils were provided with uniform and food but after the graduation were obliged to be conscripted to the navy for not less than 10 years.

So, having researched all global changes caused by the Crimean War it became possible to conclude that the second part of the 19th century can fairly be called the “golden era” of the Navy development. Anyway, the prominent military leaders finally realized that the system of banal swatting was any more of no effect for training highly qualified compliment.

Results of Research

Having conducted the historical and pedagogical analysis the authors managed to prove that scientific contribution, war experience and the technological factor made a great impact on the pedagogical views and ideas and caused serious maritime education reformation including the necessity of founding extra educational establishments of military professional training. Several Russian military leaders have been working on creating the effective doctrine having called it the Navy strategy and tactics, trying to define some basic principles of it coming to a conclusion that:

- doctrine must be meaningful and multifunctional;
- good military doctrine is of no value without good men who are well trained and provided with the proper equipment.

Conclusions

Owing to the vast territories of the Russian Empire, there had to be found an effective way of defending all of her borderlines. But primarily Russia was not equipped with the most modern weapons, and did not have a concept of higher military education to resist the Allied forces. These two factors tired together brought nothing but weakness and disaster to the Russian army. In addition, without the railway and communication network, supplies and support the army could not efficiently reach the front lines. All this was accompanied by internal social disorder, including peasant uprisings, and epidemics of diseases, weak level of military education which essentially meant that Russia had almost no legitimate chance of ever winning the Crimean War. So, analyzing the situation in general it becomes obvious that the axiom “Technology Determines Tactics” hardly needs to be proved – its nothing more than an evident fact.

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