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Нормативные и перформативные аспекты социальных прогнозов в контексте философии образования

Статья посвящена рациональной реконструкции концепции социального прогнозирования. Чтобы сделать социальные прогнозы заслуживающими доверия, каждый человек должен выполнить несколько условий: найти для своего прогноза нормативную форму социального договора, доступную всем участникам его/ее социального сообщества, принять этот социальный договор в качестве его/ее собственного обязательства перед собой и перед другими участниками, дать этому обязательству красноречивое выражение, поддерживать дискуссионную политику сообщества в режиме политики красноречия. Изучение социальных предсказаний демонстрирует значительную взаимозависимость между нормативными и перформативными аспектами. Важным достижением Гоббса было понимание не только законодательной, но и исполнительной роли социального контракта. Каждая демократия нуждается в рационализме и влияет на ценности, но циничный рационализм и слепые аффекты являются наихудшими врагами демократии и любого политического режима. Виртуозное использование языка выглядит как лучший способ для разработки политики: язык помогает получить сложную настройку рациональных причин и эмоциональных требований. Рациональное обсуждение – это способ достижения политической свободы с помощью языка. решающее значение в обсуждении имеет возможность для создания новых общих ценностей в качестве инициирования новой версии социального контракта. Социальный договор следует рассматривать не как жесткую догму, а как живую конституцию, которая требует постоянного повторного принятия.

Ключевые слова: социальные прогнозы, социальные нормы, социальный договор, политическая свобода, рациональное обсуждение, политика красноречия, ценности

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Normative and performative aspects of social predictions in the context of philosophy of education

The article is devoted to the rational reconstruction concept of social prediction. The field of education is a platform for the formation of social predictions and provides for this meeting of several generations as carriers of modern values and values of the future. To make social predictions worthy of trust every person should fulfill several conditions: to find for his/her prediction the normative form of social contract available to all participants of his/her social community, to take this social contract as his/her own commitment to himself/herself and to other participants, to give to this commitment an eloquent expression, to maintain the deliberative policy of the community in the mode of policy of eloquence. Study of social predictions demonstrates significant interdependence between normative and performative aspects. Hobbes’ crucial achievement was the understanding of not only legislative but the executive role of the social contract. Every democracy needs rationalism and affects based on values, but cynical rationalism and blind affects are the worst enemies for democracy and for every political regime. A masterly language usage looks like the best way for the performance in policy making: language helps to get a sophisticated adjustment of rational reasons and emotional demands. Deliberation is the way to liberty with the help of language, the crucial in deliberation is an opportunity for new common values creation as the initiation of a new version of the social contract. The social contract should be considered not as a rigid dogma, but as a living constitution that needs permanent re-adoption, and the field of education creates the necessary prerequisites for this – it forms the necessary competences and social practices.

Keywords: social predictions, education, social norms, social contract, liberty, deliberation, policy of eloquence, values

For Reference:
Introduction

Proponents of normativism as a methodology of social studies appeal to the values of the individual, from the one hand, and to the functional demands of society from another. However, for them, as a rule, it remains problematic to justify the functional meaning of norms for the individual and to find a value expression for the public benefit. Values remain too subjective, personal, and functions – too objective, societal. However, such an approach is more peculiar to theory and has vivid examples in social epistemology. While in practice, especially educational practice, these problems are solved with the help of certain cultural phenomena, they receive a little analytical elaboration. Typically, they are characterized as irrational – whether one talks about religion, ideology or advertising influence. It is possible to solve this epistemological contradiction by expanding the methodological arsenal of social cognition. We propose to refer to the concept of performative agency as the unity of the theoretical concept and its practical implementation. One of the first public phenomena described later with the term «performative» was maybe first specifically worked out by Thomas Hobbes, referring to the analysis of a particular kind of policy, namely, the policy of eloquence. In democratic society the sphere of education becomes the main platform for the creation of such performative competence, critical thinking etc – all that is needed for the culture of eloquence cultivating.

In this article, we analyzed the peculiarities, benefits and possible interpretations of the social predictions based on the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Main efforts were concentrated on the modern rational reconstruction of Hobbes’ model of social predictions as an attributive part of his theory of society.

Utopia as prophetic and normative social prediction

At first, it is worthwhile to consider the notion of utopia as a way of social prediction. This notion was invented by Thomas More to express the desirable future [10] and credibly – to make it closer. The advantage of utopia lies in its unlimited by real social circumstances status. It expresses and systematically arranged functional rationality of the desired social life. However, this desirability is abstract, detached from real social circumstances. How does an individual get everything he wants without abandoning what he already has? How to get rid of corruption in the state as a whole, but keep comfortable «special relations» with your own friends in power? And if you would refuse these «special relations», would your public’s requests remain and would you still interested in the common problem of corruption overcoming? After learning how to solve his own problems without coercion, the individual ceases to depend on the general system of corruption. Utopia does not answer these questions. Utopia embodies the values of the old society and offers new social functional relationships that, obviously, will generate new values. Modern researchers have already investigated utopia in terms of a value system that implements its functionality in the proper field, posing a radical critique of the existing social status and constructing conditions for the future. Robert Nozick, Jürgen Habermas, and other contemporary social thinkers offer different versions of utopian improvement, but its essence remains the same: utopia itself cannot create new values; we would like to say that it offers to «pour new wine into old wineskins» [8, Matthew
9:14-17]. It means that utopia's authors try to explain new social functions with the help of old values.

Robert Nozick tries to avoid this problem of lack of the new values through the concept of multiple utopias: «...there will not be one kind of community existing and one kind of life led in utopia. Utopia will consist of utopias, of many different and divergent communities in which people lead different kind of lives under different institutions. Some kinds of communities will be more attractive to most than others; communities will wax and wane. People will leave some for others or spend their whole lives in one. Utopia is the framework for utopias, a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community, but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others. The utopian society is a society of utopianism. (Some, of course, may be content where they are. Not everyone will be joining special experimental communities, and many who abstain at first will join the communities later after it is clear how actually they actually are working out.) Half of the truth I wish to put forth is that utopia is meta-utopia: the environment in which utopian experiments may be tried out; the environment in which people are free to do their own things; the environment which must, to a great extent, be realized first if more particular utopian visions are to be realized stably» [13, pp. 311-312]. The set of utopias don't give much stronger determination of future than single utopia. But it shows the way how utopia could come true: Nozick's utopia determines close and local futures, so it receives more chances in far futures, but loose Thomas More's global scale [10]. The concept of «good», but «micro» utopias of Habermas' consensus and other attempts to make utopia «easy to handle» lead to the similar complications.

At the same time, the functioning of society is determined not only by the domain of utopian orientations about the future but also related to the sphere of norms as a set of regulatory principles of social cohabitation. These principles create the context that determines the existing social status and makes possible the choice of the priorities for future development. The projects of relative utopias generated by local communities and social groups do not appear on empty space but are based on existing social circumstances: interests, expectations, social norms and values. It is clear that utopias cannot be alien to these circumstances or be directly opposite to them because otherwise, we should talk about the simple fantasy rather than on the quest for an alternative system of values. The existing norms always become the basis, on which the structure of the desired future is laid, even in case if the future social order demands complete destruction of these norms and values. In this sense, the study of normative foundations of social coexistence, the identification of their features in a given society allows us to determine the totality of possible trajectories of future events, allows, so to speak, narrowing the range of the search for future processes in the context of a predictive activity.

Social status necessarily implies a normative level, otherwise, we have to just talk about the situation of savagery that resembles well known Hobbes' bellum omnium contra omnes [7], in line with the unfolding chaotic struggle of individuals, determined their own selfish needs. It is clear that in this case we can't talk of any predicting of social future, because here we are not dealing with the social as a phenomenon yet, because natural state does not provide for the formation of a community, and if this kind of unity could take place at all, it becomes situational and of a short-term nature, collapses as quickly and unexpectedly as it is emerging. However, even assuming that such formations have long character – based, for example, on the arbitrary power of individual leader who through his rude uncovered
force conquer other members of the association, it could not be, however, any predictable future events in this initial unity, because such community, unlike the community within the framework of a social contract, would be deprived of any stable elements that would determine the principles of its functioning, being completely dependent on its future states from the arbitrariness of the leader. To avoid the corruption we should care not only about our own behavior, but we should care about virtues of the whole community of communication, so we could make it predictable and safe for everybody inside it.

Thus, the study of the normative basis of social existence is an important task in the sense of analyzing the methodological foundations of social forecasting.

«Thomas theorem» and the criterion of predictability

Although Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel are usually mentioned as classical normativism representatives, we suggest that the main normativism idea could be discovered in so-called «Thomas theorem»: «If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences» [22, p. 572]. So the theorem was formulated by William Isaac Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas. However, for the first time, this idea was expressed by another Thomas – Thomas Hobbes, when he argued that prophecy could become the cause of its embodiment. Also, over time, namely in 1763, it was published similar to this view idea expressed by other Thomas – Thomas Bayes, an English statistician, and philosopher. The man, who claimed that the occurrence of some event, that could be due to another event as its cause, may make indirect evidence of this event – and the larger the number of possible consequences, the greater the probability of the cause. «Given the number of times in which an unknown event has happened and failed: Required the chance that the probability of its happening in a single trial lies somewhere between any two degrees of probability that can be named» [4, p. 376]. Here, both logical and psychological errors could be possible in the constitution of the real cause, in spite of statistic correctness.

It is worth paying attention to the fact that if the accumulation of mistakes about a possible future will not be confronted with a sufficient number of facts that indicate the real state of affairs, such errors can strengthen the truthfulness of each other and create an unexpected effect that becomes independent as a new reality. Jean Baudrillard considered such an opportunity as a certain regularity of the functioning of a mass media-based society and substantiated the inevitability of the creation in such a society of «hyperreality» – that is, the simulative reality that members of society perceive as more real than the reality of material evidence [3]. Would we receive a situation when one blind entails the other blind, and all of them together go to the brink of the abyss?

Obviously, within the framework of the coherent theory of truth, it is impossible to find a criterion that would make it possible to distinguish simulative reality from the reality of material evidence. Some evidence here is based on other testimonies – and if we do not have sufficient alternative evidence, we can accept any imagination for the truth. The criterion for distinguishing simulations from the material world could be given only by a correspondent theory of truth.

Can we still find a way out of a closed circle of circular testimony? Obviously, it is worth looking for initial evidence and checking its conformity to the circumstances of the material world. In the tradition we have mentioned, this is the testimony of Thomas Hobbes: «... man observeth how one event hath been produced by another, and remembereth in them
antecedence and consequence; and when he cannot assure himself of the true causes of things (for the causes of good and evil fortune, for the most part, are invisible), he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth, or trusteth to the authority of other men such as he thinks to be his friends and wiser than himself» [7, p. 66]. Thus, with regard to predictions, it looks like that Hobbes spoke mainly about possible prophecies. Anyway, he did not consider the experience of the past as a sufficient basis for statements about the future.

On the other hand, Hobbes still saw the benefits of predictions, even in the form of prophecies. Speaking against false prophecies and warning them of fraudsters, Hobbes made two recommendations as to which prophecies could be trusted. First, these are prophecies that can be tested on experience: «And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle, we must both see it done and use all means possible to consider whether it be really done; and not only so, but whether it be such as no man can do the like by his natural power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God» [7, p. 274]. It is important that this criterion was used primarily by Hobbes in matters of religion and miracles. Consequently, this criterion should be applied even more to the ordinary predictions. The second Hobbes' criterion we could call a criterion of loyalty: the prophecy should not deny the dogmata of religion, but it should confirm them. In addition, this prophecy can be strengthened by the decision of the governor of God on earth: «Every man, therefore, ought to consider who is the sovereign prophet; that is to say, who it is that is God's vicegerent on earth, and hath next under God the authority of governing Christian men; and to observe for a rule that doctrine which in the name of God he hath commanded to be taught, and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those doctrines which pretended prophets, with miracle or without, shall at any time advance» [7, p. 269]. This last recommendation brings us to a completely pragmatic criterion for evaluating prophecies. Namely – we can support certain prophecies and neglect and condemn other prophecies.

Inside the text that seems to deal a completely religious problem, Hobbes formulates a proper pragmatic recommendation: «A private man has always the liberty, because thought is free, to believe or not believe in his heart those acts that have been given out for miracles, according as he shall see what benefit can accrue, by men's belief, to those that pretend or countenance them, and thereby conjecture whether they be miracles or lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the private reason must submit to the public; that is to say, to God's lieutenant» [7, p. 275]. So we should conclude that Hobbes subordinates the private prediction to the public one.

**Normative status of Thomas Hobbes' concept of a social contract**

In this light, to make a social prediction we should more pragmatically evaluate those social norms that appear to people not as a divine miracle, but as a social contract. Social norms are the promise of future benefits that a person will receive on condition of compliance with the contract. Moreover, this promise is not just an abstract statement, which denotes the future of a particular embodiment; a promise is a performative act, because without such a true promise, that is, without real belief in the power of prophecy, it has no chance of realization [2]. So, here we really encounter the first evidence that prediction gets much better chance to be realized, thanks to the efforts of people to make this prediction true. How does Hobbes justify this pragmatic belief?
The conceptual basis of Hobbes’ contractual theory seems to be the idea of a situation of a natural state: «...natural state preceding the formation of a society in which each individual is not bound by any principles and norms, and the motivational basis of his actions towards other individuals is the desire to subjugate and seize their property, not stopping in the process of fulfilling these aspirations even in face of physical destruction of others. In this aspect, the natural state is a continuous process of capture and redistribution of property, the main basis for the acquisition of which is the force» [15, p. 264]. Romanenko proposes to use Martin Buber's terms, so then we would say that there is an exclusively modus «I-It» relationship [5], when one individual was to be for another nothing more than just a means to achieve his own interests. According to Hobbes, here we deal with a person as a hypertrophied egocentric who has no restrictions, checks or balances, and therefore the only way of his existence is a continuous conflict with similar ones for its own domination [7]. In a situation of «war of all against all» the human being differs from the animal only by using more effective rational methods of struggle, but generally remains the same due to instincts, and his animal impulse as an indispensable component of human nature has not yet received the limitations necessary for the formation of human being in the essential meaning of this word.

Karl-Otto Apel also recognized the Hobbes' problem of social order as a normative case. «I am referring to the problem of the risk of the individual actors to be exploited when taking over co-responsibility for the common good due to non-solidarity or even egotistic parasitism of other actors. The solution for this problem, proposed by Thomas Hobbes, consisted in putting restrictions on everybody's egotistic claims by a social contract in connection with a governmental contract which was to ensure the keeping of the social contract by the sanction power of the sovereign» [1, p. 15]. Even local unions of some individuals, created as a more effective way to meet their survival needs, are of a purely temporary nature, easily decaying due to the disappearance of an immediate and acute threat, which forced them to conclude a short-term armistice, as its participants, as the carriers of unlimited will, will inevitably take advantage of weakening the attention of partners, trying to realize their claims to domination at their expense. «In the context of the natural state the desire to commit unlimited action is stronger than a desire to form the stable communities, so the struggle is irreconcilable as long as no human individuals are faced with the threat of total mutual inhibition» [15, p. 265].

The instinct of survival as the strongest animal learning, which guides human individuals, makes them look for the alternative to continuous total struggles for the preservation of life. As such a condition of survival Hobbes looks a social contract, the conclusion of which begins counting the social status, that is, causes the birth of civilization to the contrary of savagery. However, to stop the struggle it is not enough for individuals simply to develop the general principles of common life, bringing them into a certain system of norms, it is important that they ensure the natural human rights, the realization of which is guaranteed to every member, regardless of his future membership status, property ability, etc. Hobbes reveals as such norms the right to life and private property because it is their guarantee in a situation of natural state has always been in jeopardy [7]. In addition, their fundamental significance is connected with the fact that they are the guarantee, on the one hand, of the physical survival of a person, and on the other, the possibility of changing his social status throughout life, that is, allowing him to commit as a citizen.

Hobbes should be considered as normativist not only due to his idea of the social contract but also due to his theory of language. According to Hobbes, most important social norms
are to take a form of explicit contract and to be at least pronounced. This position opens wide possibilities for usage of the art of rhetoric. Later Apel tried to justify that every social norm especially moral should go through the procedure of «argumentative discourse». Apel's idea of linguistic constructivism is interested not only in the sense of the possibility of attributing some meaning to somebody's proposition in the context of the functioning of the communication-community but in the framework of the creation of normative principles of social life. Consequently, the core of his philosophical conception is the idea of discourse as a type of speech game aimed at developing of the meaningful norms of cohabitation, the implementation of which is carried out through consensus, that is, free, which does not adopt any forms of coercion, supposes the consent of all participants in the communication, which necessary should be fully equitable as «discursive partners». Apel proposed to solve even institutional and societal problems of social order with a procedure of discourse: «It has indeed to provide a foundation for everybody's co-responsibility on the level of those discourses of a communication-community that functions as a meta-institution vis a vis all human institutions and societal subsystems. This transcendental-pragmatic conception of co-responsibility, I think, is the most characteristic novel feature of discourse ethics» [1, p. 20]. The first version of such ethic was perhaps Hobbes' concept of social contract.

Traditionally Hobbes' concept of the social contract was considered as classic conventionalism while Apel built a post-conventional normative theory. Such verdict is determined perhaps by Hobbes' doctrine of a sovereign as a stable symbol of civil agreement. But if we take into consideration Hobbes' theme of social predictions, we should recognize that this agreement is not so formal and so external to citizens as this was accepted traditionally. As opposed to Hobbes Apel insisted on the ultimate justification of discourse – appealing not to the God but to the transcendental argumentation. One more position still differs in Apel re-conceptualization of Hobbes' social contract: a free access to the process of argumentation. We should remember that only Jean-Jacques Rousseau allowed women to take part in public discussion on state affairs [16]. Both these objections look for us not so crucial in the perspective of the perpetual process of clarification of norms – as in Hobbes', so in Apel's conception of norm justification. Both conceptions fit the modern understanding of normativity: «Normativity, as found on the basis of explicitly normative systems as in the case of law, is essentially prescribing actions or certain states of affairs as achievable via actions» [9, p. 68].

Social predictions as a form of personal and collective commitments are inevitable because of unstable character of the social contract: the latter could not be attained in automatic mode. Quentin Skinner underlines that in the 13th chapter of Leviathan Hobbes warned «about three elements in our nature that cannot fail to engender quarrels and war»: human competitiveness, lack of trust and thirst for glory [19, pp. 162-189]. These elements did not disappear in far past when people trespass their natural status and accept the social contract. Today, tomorrow and every day after tomorrow we will be competitive, suspicious and vain. So we still need to achieve some social contact in every new situation of social interactions.

Understanding of social norms as crucial depended on their awareness and recognition has its roots in Hobbes concept of social contract. The contract is something that needs to be adopted – otherwise, it could not be any responsibility for those who pretended to be members of civil society. Language is a guarantee of adequateness of contract understanding, it helps to fix and organize social normativity, but moreover, language opens the possibility to improve this contract.
Performative status of Thomas Hobbes' policy of eloquence

Quentin Skinner, in his Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes, also notes the performance aspect of Thomas Hobbes's philosophical position [20]. This aspect arises in the controversy of Hobbes with the Renaissance philosophy about the appointment of rhetoric. The Roman tradition inherited the art of rhetoric, which greatly contributed to the formation of the Renaissance culture in general and its philosophy in particular [21]. On the example of the philosophy of Cicero, Skinner explicitly outlines the role of rhetoric as a means of improving society: «The citizen’s principal obligation is to plead for justice in the law courts and to offer honest and profitable counsel in the assemblies. But to plead in the law courts with the aim of securing justice is at the same time to practice one of the two leading genres of rhetorical utterance, the genus iudiciale. And to offer counsel in such a way as to show that a given course of action is at once honest and profitable is to practice the other leading genre, the genus deliberatium. What is being claimed is thus that the most important activities of a good citizen are essentially rhetorical in character...» [20, p. 87]. Hobbes knew this Roman position quite well since he himself translated and published some works of the classics – in particular, he translated into English the Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric [20, p. 223].

In his youth, Hobbes also confessed the Renaissance’s humanistic faith, but at the same time, he rejected the classical idea of rhetoric just as a means of achieving a good goal. The eloquence itself is already the goal, and not just a means. Thus, Hobbes not only rejects the traditional art of eloquence but gives eloquence in its new meaning for another purpose, another social role, another, much greater force. According to Quentin Skinner’s historical investigation, in the heyday of his research forces Hobbes had arrived in convergence of rhetoric and scientific tasks of philosophy: «Also Hobbes continued to pursue his scientific aspiration in Leviathan, he undoubtedly exhibits a new willingness in this final version of his civil philosophy to combine the methods of science with the persuasive force of eloquence» [20, p. 343].

Hobbes takes strictly scientific position in evaluation of predictions but still he find the way to give them important role in social cognition and prominent meaning in political practice: «...by how much one man has more experience of things past than another; by so much also he is more prudent, and his expectations the seldomer fail him. The present only has a being in nature; things past have a being in the memory only; but things to come have no being at all, the future being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions past to the actions that are present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience, but not with certainty enough. And though it is called prudence when the event answereth our expectation; yet in its own nature it is but presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is providence, belongs only to him by whose will they are to come. From him only, and supernaturally, proceeds prophecy. The best prophet naturally is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at, for he hath most signs to guess by» [7, p. 17]. The society in the Renaissance period had clear and consistent religious character, so Hobbes used this character in the aims of the scientific perfecting of rhetoric art as an instrument of public policy.

Important achievement of Hobbes' political philosophy was implementation of rational argumentation in politics and even to the some extent in the policy: «Every deliberation is
then said to end when that whereof they deliberate is either done or thought impossible; because till then we retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our appetite, or aversion» [7, p. 38]. Hobbes looks like the forerunner of a concept of the liberal deliberative procedure elaborated later by John Rawls [14] and Jürgen Habermas. Hobbes' way of thinking is vivid in Habermas works on democracy: «Constitutional democracy is becoming a project, at once the outcome and the accelerating catalyst of a rationalization of the lifeworld reaching far beyond the political. The sole substantial aim of the project is the gradual improvement of institutionalized procedures of rational collective will-formation, procedures that cannot prejudge the participants' concrete goals. Each step along this path has repercussions on the political culture and forms of life. Conversely, without the support of the sociopolitical culture, which cannot be produced upon demand, the forms of communication adequate to practical reason cannot emerge» [6, pp. 61-62]. In many aspects due to Hobbes' concept of social contract, such democratic sociopolitical culture and democratic forms of lifeworld had been advanced in Europe since the 17th century. In spite of rising of communicative theory and practice, the individual responsibility as a result of deliberation is still the cornerstone of democracy, according to Apel: «The novel quality of the phenomenon I have in mind is constituted by the fact that in our day those actions and activities whose effects and side-effects are most far-reaching and risky, are usually not caused by individual actors. Hence, individual actors in a sense cannot really be held accountable for these actions and activities in such a way as individuals have been held responsible for their actions according to traditional morals. Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that we somehow are responsible also for the effects of collective activities» [1, p. 14]. Nevertheless, of communicative rethinking of the concept of the deliberation, this procedure demands individual decisiveness and skill in its performance. And academic sphere was the sample for Apel's idea of ideal communicative association.

Hobbes' crucial achievement was the understanding of not only legislative but the executive role of the social contract. Rousseau insisted on the contrary that it were impossible: «Were it possible for the Sovereign, as such, to possess the executive power, right and fact would be so confounded that no one could tell what was law and what was not; and the body politic, thus disfigured, would soon fall a prey to the violence it was instituted to prevent» [16, Book III 16]. As we can see for Rousseau social contract is attributed only to Sovereign and only the society as a whole could be Sovereign. This Rousseau's vision of social contract is probably not same to the vision of Hobbes. Many researchers after Rousseau tended to interpret Hobbes' social contract only in societal scale and as a legislative instrument. But Hobbes' case of social predictions gives an example of other logic – it is the logic of executive agency. The function of such agency is performed by the deliberative community. So when Rawls, Habermas, and Apel appealed to Hobbes' social contract in their elaborations of social reasoning as a permanent correcting instrument of current ruling they had sufficient reason for this.

Hobbes was aware that deliberation is endless process of specification of decisions: «And because in deliberation the appetites and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evil consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate, the good or evil effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences, of which very seldom any man is able to see to the end» [7, p. 39]. So in this direction, the determination of decisions was elaborated by Bayes. But the core of the problem is not the calculation of consequences; still, it is the vision of social good and wellness as value. Hobbes insists that the main task for the deliberation of future is the implementation of our liberty according to
our choice: «Therefore of things past there is no deliberation, because manifestly impossible to be changed; nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because men know or think such deliberation vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may deliberate, not knowing it is in vain. And it is called deliberation; because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing, or omitting, according to our own appetite, or aversion» [7, p. 37].

Following Habermas, we could move forward in an elaboration of these ideas with John Searle's concept of collective intention [18] or even further with his concept of social order [17]. But it would be less pragmatic and more epistemological way in understanding of the phenomenon of performance. Nevertheless, Searle returns our consideration to the inevitability of usage of language as a means for deliberation and argumentative communication. Is it such usage just rational? Obviously, it is not. But we could not entirely agree with Chantal Mouffe in her critic of Habermas' excessive rationalism in his concept of deliberative democracy [11]. Mouffe's model of «agonistic democracy» is based on political effects quiet often blocking the ability of rational thinking. But we suggest that affects is politically useful only if they are relevant to some political values of communities – otherwise affects leads to limitless political radicalism. Every democracy needs rationalism and affects based on values, but cynical rationalism and blind affects are the worst enemies for democracy and for every political regime. This was obvious for Hobbes. So the art of political eloquence was proposed by him for the better concordance between aims and tools in policy. A masterly language usage looks like the best way for the performance in policy making: language helps to get a sophisticated adjustment of rational reasons and emotional demands. Deliberation is the way to liberty with the help of language. We insist that education were the best place and time for such deliberation.

Meanwhile the crucial in deliberation is an opportunity for new common values creation as the initiation of a new version of the social contract. The social contract should be considered not as a rigid dogma, but as a living constitution that needs permanent re-adoptions. So, Hobbes' concept of the social contract remains its importance and new contractual theories look more like its elaboration and improvement than its substitution and rejection. Hobbes' concept of the social contract itself appears like may be the best proof of the idea of social prediction through deliberation.

Concluding reflections

Thomas Hobbes is still foreman in political reasoning and political performance and gives us a sample of the philosophical approach to the problem of social forecasting and prediction in social cognition. However, this approach requires its rational reconstruction in the terms of modern social philosophy. Such forecasting and prediction need a lot of social, cultural and political experience, but above all, they demand belief in a human ability to cooperation and faith in one's own rightness. In modern philosophical terms, to make social predictions worthy of trust an individual should fulfill several conditions: find for his prediction the normative form of social contract available to all participant of his social community, take this social contract as own commitment to himself and to other participants, give to this commitment an eloquent expression, maintain the deliberative policy of the community in the mode of policy of eloquence. Such strategy gives to social predictions a normative forth, precisely because of their proper performative expression.
Scientists and philosophers should be experts in the social predictions formulating because of their competence in discovering of causes and consequences. But very politicians could be great performers of social predictions – due to their eloquence skills. According to Hobbes, the best is the juncture of these three social roles in one person – philosopher-scientist-politician. But we have demonstrated that crucial is the communicative character of prediction implementation. Therefore the teacher and professor are the best performers for these tasks. Deliberation is not only the art of argumentation but first of all, it is the trial for reason and values. It is not the only trial for an individual or for some community – it is always trial for the needs of whole society, it is trial for the new social contract.

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